American Muslim Character Cancellation: Framing Engagement through the Sphere of Deviance by Latif, Jibril
Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 133–144
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v8i4.3121
Article
American Muslim Character Cancellation: Framing Engagement through
the Sphere of Deviance
Jibril Latif
Department of Mass Communications and Media, Gulf University for Science and Technology, 32093 Hawally, Kuwait;
E-Mail: latif.j@gust.edu.kw
Submitted: 10 April 2020 | Accepted: 31 May 2020 | Published: 15 October 2020
Abstract
While freedom of religion is constitutionally safeguarded in the United States, practice and expression thereof are mod-
ulated by apparatuses exhorting both ethnic and faith communities to flatten into expedient caricatures. The ‘moderate
Muslim’ caricature is contingently acknowledged as a victim of animus thereby expected to unquestioningly advance state
objectives. American Muslim scholars consequentially maintain a vigilant wariness of state engagement, sentiments fur-
ther intensified when Donald Trump came to power. With the Trump regime’s perilous track record, Muslims willing to
engage the federal government during the initial term were expectedly criticized. Situating the American Muslim commu-
nal consultation process (al-shūrā), this article analyzes 100 opinion editorials responding to the Department of State’s
formation of the Commission on Unalienable Rights in 2019, and its inclusion of a recognizable Muslim scholar as commis-
sioner. For disparate reasons, editorials authored by critical communal voices formulated a perceived consensus against
any engagement with the regime whatsoever, suggesting self-censoring expressive parameters and balkanization. Using
Daniel Hallin’s sphere of deviance, findings indicate that amidst increased expectations for religious leaders to be more
accessible and accommodating, communal consultation on political issues broke down in the virtual spaces the scholar’s
critics inhabitedwhilst his ownpublic relationsmessaging operatedwith discernable ambivalence. Findings further suggest
that as American Muslims increasingly identify with the social justice language of the far-left, communal thought leaders’
racial, ethnic and cultural backgrounds disproportionately factor into how their words and engagements are interpreted
and tolerated.
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1. Transcending Black and White Discourse Boundaries
During comedy sketches, Dave Chapelle can wantonly
use the N-word with seemingly unlimited license. In fact,
wielding it as a prop he generates ample laughter and
applause from white audiences allowed to laugh, but
never allowed to retell. When Chappelle’s 2019 Netflix
special Sticks & Stones was initially awarded a 0% rating
on Rotten Tomatoes because progressive critics with ex-
clusive voting rights were offended by his risqué jokes on
the social accommodation of mutable sexuality as iden-
tity in which he called gender dysphoria crazy, under the
aegis of their rubric, Chappelle was being labeled a de-
viant (Hasan, 2019). Is the N-word tolerable whilst con-
ventional appraisal of gender ideology is not? Luckily for
Chappelle, it was a hurdle overcome in irony once 40,000
audience members were allowed to democratize the au-
dience rating, shooting the score up to 99% overnight
(Hasan, 2019). This anecdote suggests that the rubric
governing discourse parameters disproportionately arbi-
trates these peculiar and distinct freedoms of expres-
sion. How much are these licenses rooted in shifting
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moralities and views of history? Could Chapelle have as
narrowly escaped cancellation if his critique had been
openly informed by his private personal conviction in
Islam? Philosopher Christopher Tollefsenmakes a similar
critique about gender dysphoria without the punchlines,
using the slightly more benign and clinical word choices
“mental illness” and “pathology,” but detractors almost
inextricably cite his identity markers—white, male and
Christian—in ad hominem rebuttals against Tollefson’s
arguments for sensible traditional morality in society
(Tollefsen, 2015). Therefore, it seems identification as
an oppressed minority wields a pathos-laden license not
necessarily extended to an individual who identifies with
the truth claims of his or her religion, and vice versa.
In such an environment, theologians guarding tradition
must tread carefully. This sentiment echoes when a well-
recognized American Muslim theologian and public in-
tellectual, Shaykh Hamza Yusuf Hanson, tells a largely
Christian audience at the Field Museum in Chicago dur-
ing philosopher Alvin Plantinga’s retirement celebration:
Given the suspicion, even the disdain among a lot
of intellectual and educated people about theology,
I sometimes hesitate when people ask me ‘what do
you teach?’ to say theology because it’s a little bit
like saying I practice alchemy or I study unicorns.
(Hanson, 2017)
Awkward boundaries function as discourse markers that
influence and govern our ever-shifting freedoms of ex-
pression in public and communal spaces, and explor-
ing them alerts us to the expected societal recourse of
who can say what from which epistemic perspective.
Throughout history, many have been allowed to conve-
niently dismiss how America’s original sins of genocide
and racial oppression still impact present-day expressive
boundaries, but the filming and media circulation of ex-
trajudicial police killings in 2020 brought about another
round of protests and uncomfortable national discus-
sions on racial ideology. Back in the 1990s, a time when
black Americans would often change their names with
zeal after converting to Islam, in both a cognitive disasso-
ciation to the name of their ancestors’ slave-owners and
the liberation that self-identification establishes, basket-
ball star Chris Jackson became Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf
mid-career. Citing his religious understanding as the ba-
sis for his refusal to stand for the National Anthem, his
right to free speech was, ostensibly, legally protected,
yet he was consequentially framed in the media as an
unpatriotic ingrate who had committed the seditious act
of becoming Muslim; he received death threats, had his
home burned to the ground, and found himself out of
the league in short order despite being one of the all-
time great shooters (Chopra, 2018). Inmore recent times,
the sports figure Colin Kaepernick similarly attempted
such a protest and found himself out of football there-
after. We can similarly intuit what the outrage would
have been if Kaepernick—who is biracial, but consid-
ered black in the United States—linked his cause to a
public commitment to Islam. Despite expressed desire
to keep his personal convictions a private matter, the
dark web similarly labeled him a Muslim for having a
Muslim companion. How can we better understand this?
For one, the labelMuslim has served as an epithet since
the country’s founding, and while Muslims are generally
bound by theology, the antecedents of race in America
have fluidlymoved discursively between religion, culture
and biology (Milani, 2014). Moreover, in the current zeit-
geist, pervasive anti-Muslim sentiments enable the me-
dia and political apparatuses to regularly flattenMuslims
into inescapable caricatures. State-funded initiatives, like
the controversial Countering Violent Extremism program
and its documented history of entrapment, suggest that
good and moderate Muslims are to assume essentializ-
ing roles as contingently protected victims of Muslim an-
imus thereby expected to unquestioningly aid the state
in problematic initiatives (Shaikh, 2019).
Islam is still the fastest growing religion in the coun-
try, especially in downtrodden communities and prisons,
with estimates wildly ranging from 3 to 15 million adher-
ents, but because of its associated social stigma many
American Muslims understandably keep their religious
commitments sequestered, woefully leaving the abject
caricatures unchallenged (Lipka, 2017). Consequentially,
this all serves to perpetuate the privation of American
Muslim social capital in the public sphere. President
Barack Obama—another Christian epithetically tagged
as Muslim—affirmed that “Muslim-Americans are our
friends and our neighbors, our co-workers, our sports
heroes,” to which Donald Trump responded on Twitter:
“Obama said in his speech that Muslims are our sports
heroes. What sport is he talking about, and who? Is
Obama profiling?” (Borchers, 2015). During his 2016 can-
didacy, Trump politically mobilized festering Muslim ani-
muswith sophistic pronouncements such as “Islamhates
us” and once in office, the rhetoric and policies proved
unremitting. Despite his conceptual usage being consis-
tently and vapidly incorrect, as Islam is not a proper noun,
Trump’s demagogic ploys framedMuslims with a diminu-
tion of dignity that may be likened to what has been per-
petuated against the black community. Although liken-
ing one grievance to another typically portends falla-
cious reasoning, evidenced by intersectional movements
that appropriate the history of racial struggles to ad-
vance ideological agendas on gender and sexuality, it
is critical to refrain from summarily dismissing how the
combination of racial and religious identities work in
the American context where unapologetic and dynamic
black American Muslims like Malcolm X, Muhammad
Ali, Warith Deen Mohammed and Kareem Abdul-Jabbar
brought Islam into the American consciousness. It is both
an epic tale of how hard-fought social capital was gained
and also a tragic tale of how it was thereafter squan-
dered, a situation aggravated by intercommunal contes-
tation over authority tied to race. Timothy Daniels (2019,
p. 66) frames abiding intercommunal tensions as a lack
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of “respectful and principled relationships” between in-
digenous and immigrant communities, acknowledging a
binary in how black American Muslims were supplanted
in representation and authority by immigrant Muslim
communities that appeared in large numbers after immi-
gration reform in 1965; it is the thesis Sherman Jackson
(2005) has outlined, an evolution of frayed relationships
as binary chronologies critical to understanding the cul-
tural and ideological trajectories of today’s fragmenta-
tion. Jackson further argues that irreconciliation with
black suffering abides as a key issue of contestation on
authority amongst American Muslims (Jackson, 2009).
Nevertheless, as miscegenation and indigenization
occur, black and white boundaries become less able to
provide a totalizing picture of today’s communal dynam-
ics. Ideology and first principles more appropriately ex-
plain that division.While a fewMuslims do receive cover-
age in the public sphere, the obscured caveat is that they
must almost exclusively use the framework laid down by
political progressives, exemplified by the sneering polit-
ical satire Netflix allows Hasan Minhaj, the smutty com-
edy Hulu allows Ramy, or the conditional advocacy the
far-left offers Linda Sarsour’s version of intersectional ac-
tivism. In juxtaposition, Hanson operates within a clas-
sical anti-nominalist perspective that affirms traditional
realities now deemed offensive to some, such as hier-
archies, while maintaining a voracious reading appetite
akin to the late Harold Bloom’s and a honed gift of per-
suasive oratory that combines vast amounts of seemingly
disparate perspectives into theological sermons. It was
this generational ability that catapulted him into the pub-
lic spotlight in the 1990s. For brevity, we can pinpoint one
encapsulating example from 2004, when Hanson spoke
in front of Shakespearean scholars at London’s Globe
Theatre and proposed an anagogical reading of Othello’s
Iago as Santiago de Mato Moros (James the Moor
slayer), the personification of evil as Conquistadoreswho
had driven Muslims out of Spain instead of promoting
La Convivencia (coexistence). Culturally attenuated eru-
dition able to offer metaphysical conceits and new read-
ings of Shakespeare, whilst also masterfully navigating
the Qur’an, is a rare ascent that impresses many west-
erners, especially Muslims. However, there are both op-
portunities and perils in how this capacity resonates
with non-Muslim audiences comprised largely of white,
Christian conservatives with elite educations who wel-
come a moderate presentation that amalgamates east
and west out of a shared concern for the plight of tra-
ditional mores in society, and the encroachment of sec-
ularism. Naturally, when philosopher Alvin Plantiga’s re-
tirement ceremony was hosted by the John Templeton
foundation in 2017, Hanson was selected as perhaps the
solitaryMuslim scholar qualified to deliver an address ac-
knowledging Plantiga’s contributions and those of other
Christian philosophers like G. K. Chesterton, another en-
capsulation reinforcing why he is celebrated in conserva-
tive circles for arguing the continued relevance of reason-
able faith in the public sphere:
People today…glibly dismiss belief in God as inher-
ently unreasonable, and yet they’ll say ‘I don’t be-
lieve in God’ without ever looking at some of the
arguments. The same people, however, will believe
in things like quarks and neutrinos; they’ll believe in
dark matter and they won’t know the science that
substantiates belief in those things. They simply trust
the scientists that believe in such phenomena that we
can’t see. We have theologians also that have their
arguments for believing in the things that they don’t
see. Just likemost people believe in scientists without
really knowing their proofs, many believers, simple
people, believe what their teachers and their philoso-
phers tell them without having their proofs. So, we
forget that the age of science is also an age of faith.
Just like the age of faith, was actually also an age of
science. And, something that we forget is that the
epistemology of trust is foundational in our world.
(Hanson, 2017)
In 2019, Hanson was appointed as a commissioner on
the Department of State’s Commission on Unalienable
Rights, which convened under the aegis of President
Trump’s Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. The engage-
ment was controversial to American Muslims who are
generally split on how to value contingent acknowledg-
ment from the dominant culture. Because no matter
how assimilated or integrated descendants of Muslim
immigrants become, Shakespeare cannot become part
of their cultural heritage; moreover, critical voices argue
that they should check the impulse present among com-
munal members who myopically seek asymmetrical val-
idation, questioning whether it is worth their commu-
nity’s top scholars having to, as they see it, fit themold of
a conservative Catholic theologian in order to sit at the
table. Unquestionably, some are ultracrepidarians with
axes to grind, however, others comprise former support-
ers and donors perplexed by the optics of recent engage-
ments with no real access to dialogue or nuanced ex-
planation. Indicating a perceived communal consensus
against engagement with the Trump administration, vo-
cal critics found a synergy on the issue despite promoting
disparate ends. In that light, this article examines shifting
boundaries of expression as they pertain to theAmerican
Muslim community by surveying opinion editorials writ-
ten in response to Hanson’s appointment.
2. Interpretive Audiences: Trained and Untrained
Interpreters
In the study of religions, an important distinction ex-
ists in the bifurcation of the normative and descriptive
approaches. As authoritative interpreters of normative
tradition, theologians must equip themselves with the
tools needed for navigating scriptures and communicat-
ing them effectively to audiences. What modern audi-
ences in turn do with such messages as they are filtered
through cultural matrices is perhaps more indicative of
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culture than intrinsic representation of Islam itself. For
centuries, Muslims have congregated in sacred spaces
while observing hierarchical dynamics deferentially bind-
ing congregants to scholars in acknowledgment that in-
tellect and decades of demanding training in the tradi-
tion, its scripture and concomitant sacerdotal languages,
its spiritual sciences, and its sacred law are prerequisites
that deem scholars esteemed inheritors of the prophets.
On the other hand, Muslims emphasize scholarly fallibil-
ity and engage in consultative interaction (al-shūrā) in
a symbiosis that forces scholars to attenuate their dik-
tats to each zeitgeist. Epistemically, of course, there are
differences between the first principles and processes
that dominate western-conceptualized democratic pro-
cesses, but researchers have also noted tremendous
overlaps (Bulliet, 2004).
In the classical context, an archetypal Muslim scholar
was an erudite polymath possessing the advantages of
access to knowledge, rarefied mastery, and the free-
dom to offer declarative statements with little fear of
reprisal due to the financial and political independence
the waqf endowment system provided. Such myriad ad-
vantages very often precluded the possibility of decen-
tering dialogues between lay congregants and scholars,
whereas today widespread functional literacy and the
diffuse proliferation of knowledge perplex theologians
who thereby struggle to maintain the primacy of re-
ligious scripture amid rapidly changing societal norms.
In the traditional Muslim world, post-colonial traumas
have contributed to a concomitant communal crisis of
authority and ethics. As a result, Muslim scholars to-
day are largely politically snarled and financially ham-
strung (Tripp, 2006). The distinctive emergent percep-
tions complicate AmericanMuslim dynamicswhen those
from the traditional Muslim world arrive on America’s
shores and interject post-colonial notions of Islam and
politics into local discussions in unawareness of complex
local histories.
Furthermore, the blurring of lines between laity and
scholarship allows for the unqualified to maintain plat-
forms feigning as authorities, a decentering that social
media heavily exacerbates. Online influencers, commu-
nity activists, and woke Muslims trained in secular crit-
ical methods, yearning for certain progressive readings
of scripture, seek to expeditiously democratize interpre-
tation in ways that displace the role of traditional schol-
arship. Analogously, reader response theory popularized
by Stanley Fish (2001) has recently dominated the inter-
pretive landscape of poetry; hence, to read John Milton
in a university class is often to read through a heuristic
lens that similarly decenters authorial intent and mean-
ing. John Mullan (2001) points out how it is neither im-
partial nor insignificant that Fish’s coterie declares “no
principles” or that “there is no truth, only fancy argu-
ment,” and questions why readers should accept guides
that unrelentingly aim at wrestling texts to their own
cause. Correspondingly, interpretive religious scholars
are increasingly reduced to ceremonial conductors of
weddings or funerals and told to stay in their lane and
out of secular life, especially politics.
3. Shifting Political Consensus
A shifting political consensus also disfavors the licenses
of expression extended to theologians becauseAmerican
Muslims were principally political conservatives before
9/11, whereas a stagger leftward was thereafter engen-
dered by the copious presence of anti-Muslim ideologies
on the right such as neoconservatism and Zionism, and
the perceptibly higher levels of external empathy and ac-
commodation displayed by some on the left. Thus, to-
day most American Muslims self-identify as principally
liberal even though a practicingMuslim has more shared
virtue interests with traditional conservatism (Mogahed
& Chouhoud, 2017). The Economist (“Why American
Muslims,” 2019) observes the end of a time when nearly
50% of votes went to Republicans (now 11%), and the
patterned emergence of progressive Muslim politicians
like Keith Ellison, Rashida Tlaib, and Ilhan Omar as a
reflection of shifting ideological landscapes. Muslims
now mostly lean towards the most far-left wing of the
Democratic Party. In contrast, Hanson chooses to dia-
logue with embattled conservatives who—like the late
Roger Scruton—espouse conservatism as looking first at
what is right in the world and setting out to conserve it,
rather than seeking out first what is wrong in the world
and endeavoring to fix it. Both readings have their tex-
tual support from exegetical commentaries, but what
appears rare about this particular age is the disappear-
ance of a line that opposing communal parties agree not
to cross out of respect, where attacks do not become
malicious or personal. Hanson, who co-founded Zaytuna
College with Zaid Shakir and Hatim Bazian, was acknowl-
edged for a long duration as the most influential scholar
of Islam in the west, but as communities adopt differ-
ent visions of the world, influence shifts. For instance, in
both 2016 and 2020 the Los Angeles Times covered the
remarkable American Muslim support for progressive
Senator Bernie Sanders, citing Imam Omar Suleiman, a
voice for activist-minded adherents that prioritizes their
specific political concerns: “Muslims are progressive on
issues like healthcare, immigration, criminal justice re-
form, climate change. There is also concern about mili-
tarism, there’s concern about Israel and Palestine, and
if Muslims will have their civil liberties” (Kaleem, 2019).
Demonstrative of the trend, many of Hanson’s longtime
students and colleagues, including Bazian, supported the
group Bay Area Muslims for Bernie, and when Sanders
dropped out and endorsed Joe Biden, most community
members followed suit.
Hanson initially shared in his community’s castiga-
tion of Trump by publicly criticizing him, but he has
also demonstrated a willingness to engage each succes-
sive administration in a principled nonpartisan manner
(Kaleem, 2019). While engagement was questioned less
during the Obama administration’s tenure because the
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regime made discernable attempts to engage Muslims
at public events like the annual White House iftar, the
foreign policy of annexing Palestine and drone strik-
ing Muslim lands was no less problematic. Therefore, it
seems to be with an even hand that back in June of
2016, when Trump was still the Republican nominee,
Hanson critically remarked to CNN: “He’s playing a dan-
gerous game, and a lot of lives are threatened by that
type of saber-rattling. We’re in an extremely volatile
situation and social media has introduced an unprece-
dented element that we don’t fully understand” (Yusuf,
2016a). Then, days after Trumpwon the election Hanson
somberly blogged:
I still did not believe that a man, who appeared to
publicly mimic a reporter’s palsy, labeled Mexican mi-
grants rapists and criminals, and, in the most explicit
language, boasted of groping women, could ever be
elected president—not in the United States, surely.
Well, I was wrong. (Yusuf, 2016b)
As an unofficial ambassador, Hanson attempted to as-
suage tangible communal fears that an internment of
Muslims was “highly unlikely,” reassuring readers that
the visible racist and violent backlash was only “a fringe
element” (Yusuf, 2016b). He tried to humanize the “good-
hearted people who voted for Trump” and discouraged
responding with fear and despair:
Now is the time to realize that we have too much
work to do, not protesting, not lighting fires, not say-
ing, ‘Trump is not my president.’ He is, and that is how
our system works: by accepting the results and mov-
ing on. (Yusuf, 2016b)
For Hanson, avoiding perpetual protest entailed contin-
uing to foster interfaith consensus building with conser-
vatives, many of whom were in the ‘never Trump’ camp
themselves. As the scion of a notable family from Marin
County, California, his immersion in the western canon,
including training in medicine and various religious tra-
ditions all compliment four decades of training in Islam.
Sharing both culture with conservatives and interests,
such as fighting against pornography and religious perse-
cution, Hanson’s alliances culminated into stalwart con-
servative recommendations for his appointment on the
federal commission as oneof the rarely equippedMuslim
intellectuals in America suited to debate policy recom-
mendations on fundamental human rights as situated by
natural law. However, Hanson’s post-election blog post
would be one of his last for the next several years, which
would prove pivotal from a public relations perspective
that necessitates maintaining channels of symmetric di-
alogue with communal stakeholders. In December 2016,
Hanson was embroiled in the first of several successively
aggregating controversies. In front of 25,000 Muslims
(and several influential Christian pastors) in Toronto, pro-
gressive journalist Mehdi Hassan equated Islamophobia
with racism and asked Hanson pointblank if he regret-
ted not endorsing Black LivesMatter (BLM). By that time,
discerning people, and most conservatives, had come to
share concerns about the particular Marxist ideological
orientation and intersectional queer identity politics that
undergird the incorporated BLM platform called Black
Lives Matter Foundation, Inc. and its radical calls for the
destruction of heteronormativity and the nuclear family,
as well as its antagonism towards law enforcement. The
situation called for the tall order of acknowledging and
critiquing the prevalence of unarmed black men being
terrorized by police, while simultaneously humanizing
police offers and maintaining opposition to the specific
agenda of Black Lives Matter, Inc. without shirking the
importance of racial equality. However, whisked off of an
international flight and thrust on stage by conference or-
ganizers, an exhausted Hanson seemed caught off guard
by the question and blundered by responding with de-
contextualized racial crime statistics instead of first as-
suaging communal concerns with typically measured nu-
ance. When the response lacked methodical precision, it
provided an opening for detractors to call him a racist.
This prompted him to deliver an apology in which he
historically situated the disintegration of the black fam-
ily and successive erosion of religious morality as the
primary threats to black Americans. However, to ideo-
logues invested in accusing him of dismissing structural
injustices, this analysis incensed them even further. In
the escalation on social media both detractors and for-
mer associates excoriated him, claiming that white priv-
ilege purportedly precluded his ability to offer objective
observations on racial matters (Latif, 2018). With his in-
tentions and decades of public service being questioned,
Hanson was visibly pained and subsequently stopped
blogging, and thereafter all of his administrator-run so-
cial media accounts were also closed down in early 2017.
Thereafter, the dialogue between supporters and critics
essentially broke down. Throughout this entire ordeal,
Hanson was reductively framed as an archetypal and out
of touch white male, which ostensibly made him part of
the problem.
Intensifying factional disagreements in the aftermath
was a lack of symmetric dialogue and access. Locating
and tracing the evolution of Hanson’s opinions is actu-
ally quite a challenge. For one, the transient economic in-
frastructure underpinning the 1990s and 2000s nascent
Muslim speaking circuit resulted in disparate entities
owning copyrights to popular speakers’ talks and intellec-
tual contributions. Furthermore, most of Hanson’s most
important statements have been made at informal con-
ferences under the pretenses that they are to be public
communal addresses, as is the case with talks he pre-
viously delivered annually in Toronto; however, record-
ings are rarely ever released, nor are agenda, minutes,
summaries or transcripts. Therefore, when detractors
debate his supporters online, there is no recourse to
an official catalogue or directory of his chronicled posi-
tions. Another point of criticism is his inaccessibility to
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the wider community outside of an inner circle, which
some may or may not reassess when weighing factors
such as administrative demands and security concerns.
Moreover, Hanson’s most notable lessons have been de-
livered at summer retreats at global sites where atten-
dance is contingent on a selectively screened application
process and attendance fee, the videos of which some-
times appear cataloguedmanymonths or years later on a
subscription-based streaming service called Deenstream
with expressed copyright. Like many popular speak-
ers, Hanson’s content is pirated from the Deenstream
livestream feed by unofficial accounts that subsequently
flood YouTube and other platforms with small clips rela-
beled by uploaders with provocative titles intended to
garner clicks. In the stead of internally curated and ti-
tled video clips, the pirated and mislabeled clips are reg-
ularly forwarded on social media pages, including those
of Hanson’s colleagues at Zaytuna College, an ambiguous
public relationsmessage softly signaling a laissez faire tol-
erance towards continued copyright infringement.
This brief situation analysis, in which abiding con-
testations were further obfuscated by the communica-
tive transmission process, partially contextualizes the
critical outrage expressed when the State Department
named Hanson as commissioner on the Commission
on Unalienable Rights in early July 2019 because crit-
ics already shared cognitive reference points for fram-
ing Hanson’s recent actions within a consecutive se-
quence of misjudgments. Therefore, with his personal
blogging ceased, no personal social media engagement,
and no detectable institutional public relations tactics
to preempt the community with a statement of ratio-
nale, Hanson’s detractors consequentially produced nu-
merous critiques during July and August of 2019 that for-
mulated a perceptible media consensus that stood es-
sentially unchallenged thereafter. Furthermore, Hanson
declined numerous offers to comment with mainstream
outlets seeking clarification, leaving guidance for inter-
ested community members in short supply.
4. Methodology and Data
For many, Edward R. Murrow’s 1954 condemnation of
Senator Joseph McCarthy’s allegation that communists
and Soviet spies had infiltrated government and indus-
try serves as a historical marker, a moment whenmorally
compelled objective observers pivoted out of journalistic
descriptivism into morally conscientious prescriptivism.
Situating politicalmedia history, DavidMindich likens the
ascendancy of the Trump administration to a Murrow
moment in part of his larger criticism that American au-
diences are increasingly less informed voters who make
decisions based on slogans and that voicing a subjec-
tive opinion on the administration can severely polarize
a person’s public persona, thereby discouraging voices
from exercising their freedom of expression (Mindich,
2016). A suggested heuristic for conceptualizing this phe-
nomenon is a journalistic analysis of contested dialogues
about the VietnamWar. Daniel Hallin (1986) utilized me-
dia framing to describe how communities receive infor-
mation, dividing public opinion into three parts within
the opinion corridor: the sphere of consensus where
writers can invoke what are considered shared assump-
tions, the sphere of legitimate controversy that forces
interlocutors to attempt editorial objectivity, and the
sphere of deviance whereby interlocutors feel autho-
rized in censoring ideas deemed beyond the pale.
In response to the formation and announcement of
the Commission on Unalienable Rights in the summer of
2019, hundreds of opinion editorial articles were pub-
lished in the mainstream press. I read through them
in search of an overlap in themes, and then I limited
the data collection to 100 articles published within the
90-day media cycle surrounding the July 8, 2019 an-
nouncement of the commission. The overwhelming ma-
jority of articles published took a very critical stance, the
themes ranging from critiques against the formation of
the panel itself, to numerous allegations against its mem-
bers and their stances on issues like abortion, with many
going as far as alleging that the panel had an ulterior mo-
tive to advance Christian fundamentalism at the policy
level. As these themes dominated the corpus, I included
articles in the data collection from The Washington Post,
Politico, The New York Times, Reuters, The Wall Street
Journal, The New Yorker, CNN, The Los Angeles Times,
The Nation, The Guardian, Chronicle, Salon, Al Jazeera,
and several other ‘mainstream’ outlets that specifically
mention Hanson and generally fall under the center-left
and far-left political rubric. Then, in attempting to bal-
ance the data, I ran searches for articles about the com-
mission that praised its efforts, and found several arti-
cles published at conservative, religious and libertarian
outlets such as The Cato Institute. Next, I searched for
articles that kept their reporting to more descriptive ac-
counts, which led to articles from centrist perspectives
published at outlets such as The Atlantic. I analyzed all of
the articles and categorized the arguments into themes.
In search of amethod that would provide a better op-
portunity for this thematic analysis to materialize I con-
ducted a cross analysis on authors in order to verify
authorial connections to the Muslim community, ana-
lyzing documented publication history in Muslim com-
munal public spaces and platforms. From this deduc-
tive method I was able to identify 40 of the articles
as being authored by public figures in the American
Muslim community, all of whom mentioned the inclu-
sion of Hanson on the commission as a primary interest
in their pieces. Hanson has authored numerous books
and has served as editor in chief and contributor for two
peer-reviewed journals: Seasons and Renovatio. After
reading his extant list of publications and then close
reading the critical opinion editorials, dominant themes
emerged. Among authors with links to the American
Muslim community, the locus of criticism about Hanson
primarily utilizes distinctly progressive political modes
of argumentation almost entirely devoid of theologi-
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cal rationale or engagement with his publication track-
record. This finding reinforced the balkanization hypoth-
esis of discourse breaking down within communities.
Coincidentally, these 40 articles were shared and dis-
cussed widely on social media platforms and private
WhatsApp groups in the Muslim community (in contrast
to the other 60), indicating an inner-communal impact
that has remained difficult to measure. As media re-
searchers point out, forums for debate are governed
by their own type of logic, sometimes utilized as self-
perceived correctives pushing back against narratives in
the traditional media space deemed problematic (Holt,
2018). There is scant research investigating such discord
in the American Muslim community from a media per-
spective, but this eventwas a clear example of inner com-
munal discord (fitnah) becoming publicly elicited.
Therefore, using Hallin’s sphere of deviance after
identifying the site of contestation to the widely shared
opinion editorials, I divided the 100 articles thematically
into four distinct categories.
The first category comprisesmainstream publications
contesting the commission’s mandate to examine the
root bases of inalienable rights in order to advise policy-
makers at the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor Affairs. Critics at progressive publications like The
Washington Post fear the commission’s language is code
for curtailing progressive advances, or in the words of
Politico a “counterweight to an expansive liberal view on
human rights” (Toosi, 2019). Attempting to assuage such
fears, ChairpersonMaryAnnGlendon responded to these
charges in a podcast, stating: “I would suggest that they
read the charter of the commission…instead of indulging
in wild speculation….It’s an independent study group and
it has been directed to focus on principles and not poli-
cies or specific issues” (Howell, 2019). This category con-
tains broader criticism, including some of Hanson, not as
central to the discussion, but as one in a group of purport-
edly threatening religious caricatures; as feminist publica-
tionMs.Magazine charges: “ShaykhHamza YusufHanson
sees marriage equality for LGBTIQ people as a sign of the
End Times” (Susskind & Stern, 2019).
The second category comprises conservative and lib-
ertarian praise for the commission’s initiative, such as an
article by The Cato Institute suggesting: “If this new com-
mission can refocus America’s human rights thinking and
policy on America’s first principles, grounded in our un-
alienable natural rights, the implications are far reaching,
not only for the rest of the world but for America itself”
(Pilon, 2019). Within this category there are many posi-
tive allusions to the inclusion of aMuslim. Robert George,
one of the most prominent and influential Catholics in
theUnited States, is a persisting advocate for Hanson’s in-
clusion, and by directive of the Second Vatican Council’s
interfaith initiativeNostra AetateGeorge (2019) similarly
fosters dialogue on shared prerogatives:
It has been my privilege and joy to work with
Muslims…in defending human life in all stages and
conditions, beginning with child in the womb; in se-
curing religious freedom for people of all faiths; in pro-
tecting refugees from persecution and terror; in op-
posing pornography and human trafficking; and in up-
holding marriage as the union of husband and wife.
Another influential Catholic leader, Thomas S. Hibbs
(2020), praises Hanson’s thought in The Dallas Morning
News: “Such a conception of religion, education and tra-
dition may well provide a salutary counter not only to
much of contemporary Islamic thought and practice; it
is also an alternative to tribalistic trends in advanced
Western culture.” The smaller third category comprises
several journalistically descriptive reports on Hanson’s
inclusion on the commission, such as Emma Green’s
(2017) piece in The Atlantic titled “Muslim Americans
Are United by Trump-and Divided by Race.” However, the
fourth category comprises editorial polemics and critical
pieces classified as cyber shūrā, dissenting statements
that can be attributed to public figures in the American
Muslim community who can be held accountable for
their public remarks (Latif, 2018). I isolate this fourth
category of approximately 40 articles for closer analysis
based on their critical discourse modes. The overly de-
scriptive nature of this method is a shortcoming, while
simultaneously a benefit in its ability to isolate thematic
sentiment across a spectrum of articles.
5. Cyber Shūrā: American Muslim Opinion Editorials
Close reading of the opinion editorials reveals long-
standing embedded contestations about communal
chronologies and scaffolded issues of disputation. One
stretches back towhenHansonwas summoned to advise
theWhiteHouse immediately after 9/11. Hanson deliber-
ately spent his fewminutes in theOval Office highlighting
essential verses from the Quran and imploring President
George W. Bush not to launch an international war in re-
taliation to the acts of vigilantes. However, on the way
out, Hanson excoriated the tentatively titled investiga-
tion ‘Operation Infinite Justice’ as blasphemous, towhich
Bush responded by immediately changing the name, and
later, the entire scope from investigation to full-scale in-
vasion, which infamously destroyed untold numbers of
lives in Iraq and the wider region. Despite the exchange
being awell-documented saga in American history, some
of Hanson’s detractors have falsely alleged that Hanson
endorsed the actual invasion of Iraq on the mere condi-
tion of Bush’s name change. Hanson later acknowledged
that simply engaging the president irreparably damaged
his reputation and opened the door to endless criticism
and libel. This danger, of being framed as a ‘moderate
Muslim’ caricature still looms. It has had an impact on
his accessibility thereafter, as Genieve Abdo notes in her
monograph on the rare occasion of being granted inter-
view access at his California home: “Hamza Yusuf felt
he had been misquoted everywhere-in newspapers, on
television, and on the Internet—sometimes deliberately”
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(Abdo, 2007, p. 13). All of this communally contested his-
tory is thematically embedded into the critical pieces, of-
ten intertwinedwith a critique of Hanson’s long-standing
affiliation with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a coun-
try where he studied on scholarship in the early 1980s.
A congressional policy paper outlines theUAE’s global po-
litical conflicts, which are particularly upsetting to many
American Muslims, not only because of United States-
backed UAEmilitary involvement in countries like Yemen,
but also for its publication of terror lists implicatingmain-
streamMuslim charitable institutions in the same breath
as bonified terror groups (Katzman, 2019). Furthermore,
in 2018 Hanson told an interviewer at an interfaith con-
ference in the UAE: “The Emirates, inside the country,
this is a country committed to tolerance” (5Pillars, 2018).
Despite what seemed like an attempt to qualify praise of
the country with conditional intonation signaling an ex-
clusion of its foreign policy, a transcription of the quote
went viral and he was widely denounced on social me-
dia for the statement. Another uniting theme in the
critiques is solidarity in resistance to Executive Order
13769 (Trump, 2017), titled “Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” which is
also known colloquially as “TheMuslimBan.” Also inextri-
cably linked to race and ethnicity, GeorgetownUniversity
has produced research on the ban’s flaws, such as how
it cites anti-Muslim conspiracy theories for justification
in banning nationals from several Muslim-majority coun-
trieswhile ignoring how theUnited States has intervened
militarily or otherwise in the banned countries “directly
creating, or facilitating the conditions that have led to
violence and political instability” (Şekerci & Crnkovich,
2019). For some Muslims, the ban is not a priority is-
sue. But for others, engaging the administration that
has implemented several iterations of the ban is beyond
the pale.
Keeping the outrage these related issues engender
in perspective therefore contextualizes the unfiltered in-
dignation expressed in some online reactions by public
figures, many of whom Hanson has prior associations
to such as Yale professor Zareena Grewal (2019) who
Tweets: “If you are willing to defend Hamza Yusuf’s new
low, aligning with the Trump administration as an advi-
sor, you’re no friend of mine.” Similarly outraged, profes-
sor Ovamir Anjumposts on Facebook: “For nearly twenty
years I bit my tongue and have not publicly ridiculed
him, thinking that he is a foolish, egotistic, but harmless
preacher. I was wrong” (Anjum, 2019). Commenting on
the post, Imran Muneer, host of the The Mad Mamluks
podcast says: “Everyone kept turning a blind eye to it
and giving him the benefit of doubt. Nomore. Insha’allah
(God willing)” (Anjum, 2019). These public comments
on social media give context to the type of often unre-
strained ire displayed in the 40 articles that specifically
critique Hanson. For instance, Professor Maha Hilal’s ed-
itorial (2019) on Al Jazeera provocatively titled “It’s Time
for Muslim Americans to Condemn Hamza Yusuf” mixes
in thematic critique of Hanson’s affiliation to the UAE.
Her ideological perspective in concluding that the com-
mission is “clearly designed to enable anti-black, anti-
women, Islamophobic and xenophobic policy decisions”
as well as her labeling Hanson a ‘cis white male’ is in-
dicative of the intersectional ideologies and languages
used to disrupt objective and administrable descriptions
of people’s sex markers. However, pivoting into per-
haps legally libelous territory Hilal repeats the slander-
ous claim that Hanson “met President George W. Bush
and endorsed his decision to launch a military campaign
against terrorism” (Hilal, 2019). The same defamation ap-
pears in SamHamad’s (2019) piece in TheNewArab, who
charges “he was the only Muslim to essentially endorse
GeorgeW. Bush’s criminal, murderous and generally dev-
astating War on Terror.” In addition, Hamad similarly as-
sumes the intersectional stance of accusing the commis-
sion of having an ulterior motive “to reshape the defi-
nition of ‘unalienable rights’ along the lines of Trump’s
alt-right agenda, with LGBT rights and women’s repro-
ductive rights obvious targets” (Hamad, 2019). English
language Arab media sites, especially those editorially
opposed to the UAE, increasingly use similar ideologi-
cal language.
While malevolent attacks coalesce into the larger
body of criticism, the less overtly polemical pieces bring
up salient points while avoiding much of the ideolog-
ical language. For instance, they give consideration to
a range of issues such as the consequences of disen-
gaging with the government for four to eight-year ad-
ministrative periods, in contrast to having an American
Muslim presence in rooms where impactful policy rec-
ommendations are being discussed. These critiques are
embodied by Professor Khaled Beydoun’s (2019) piece,
“For American Muslims, Hamza Yusuf’s Endorsement of
Trump Is One Step Too Far,” which begins by acknowledg-
ingHanson’s human rights advocacy “demonstrated time
and again” for Yemen, Syria and the Rohingya before
referencing Hanson’s statements on Black Lives Matter
in Toronto as one of the “recent precedents” that “sig-
nal a clear trajectory…toward power and away from the
people.” Beydoun then proceeds to pragmatically con-
textualize his interpretation of Hanson’s perceived shift
in approach:
Yusuf the spiritual and political firebrand is no more.
And toomanywithin theMuslim American and global
milieus still latch onto a version and vision of Yusuf
that has been replaced by a man who views power,
and the most vile stewards of it, as useful chan-
nels toward improving the humanitarian conditions of
Muslims around the world. (Beydoun, 2019)
Similarly, journalist Azad Essa’s (2019) piece “Hamza
Yusuf and the Struggle for the Soul ofWestern Islam” also
offers initial praise before noting perplexedly: “The man
who once suggested Muslims were wary of any scholar
too close to the government is now working with Trump,
and seen by some as an Emirati stooge.” Additionally,
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Daniel Haqiqatjou (2019) begins his critique by pref-
acing his empathy with Hanson’s supporters: “I get it.
I used to defend Sh Hamza Yusuf for certain things as
well….When there is a repeated pattern of statements
and associations, we are left no choice but to revisit
prior assumptions.’’
Close analysis of this set of articles suggests that it is
unlike categories 1, 2 and 3, in that minimal treatment
is allocated to addressing the human rights agenda on
the commission’s terms as evidenced by scarce referenc-
ing to any publications of its commissioners, the open
commission meetings, agendas, minutes, or the charter
itself, seemingly affirming the hypothesis of balkaniza-
tion through the formation of filter bubbles. However, it
is similar to the bulk of criticism in that the pieces largely
avoid using the truth claims of Islam or its concomitant
scripture to establish or refute points. The issues rest
squarely on political assumptions. Criticisms of Hanson
voiced by prominent North American Muslim professors
Mohammad Fadel, Jonathan A. C. Brown, and Joseph
Lumbard, as well as censure coming from religious schol-
ars such as Suhaib Webb and Shadee ElMasri, therefore,
stand out as outliers in their select use of religious justi-
fications in comparison to the data set. Despite the out-
liers, the dialogue between critics and supporters largely
remains fixated on the optics of what is reduced at times
to “joining Trump’s human rights panel” (Farooq, 2019).
However, resisting the impulse to frame things so simplis-
tically hinges on a level of nuance that perhaps cannot
be expected of non-specialists on social media, because
while the connection to Trump was technically indirect,
since the commission was comprised of civil servants un-
der an independent mandate, thematic discourse mark-
ers consistently focus on the fact that it reported to the
Department of State, and was led by a member of the
Cabinet who was nominated by Trump.
6. Conclusions
This article has tried to note that various factors impact
freedom of expression, from racial and ethnic identity
markers, to contested chronologies, to ideology and re-
cent information bias, all of which play roles in deter-
mining who has what license. Opinionated people have
always met fierce opposition. However, when race and
identity politics constitute such aggravating factors in the
AmericanMuslim community’s critical subconsciousness
and its widespread opposition to an administration, a
Muslim scholar’s identity markers can become over em-
phasized in public scrutiny. Moreover, within the data
corpus some appearmerely fixated on settling old scores,
while others seem to loathe why a ‘cis whiteman’ gets to
represent Muslims in circles of power and in dominant
culture. Emphasis on such mediocre critiques, however,
obfuscates attention away from judicious dialogues that
raise legitimate points. In this case, after the publication
of successive critical periodicals Hanson’s Wikipedia en-
try was edited to read “controversial American Islamic
scholar.” However, when editorially contested by sup-
porters, Wikipedia struggled to substantiate the label,
and “controversial” was just as easily edited out (“Hamza
Yusuf,” n.d.). As a mirror of deconstructionist culture
encyclopedias function as commercial artifacts that re-
flect the pursuit of verifiability over truth as it is socially
constructed by perennially changing discourse (Gaitano,
2016). Nevertheless, such dominant markers are still im-
portant. While criticism has a place, it often tacitly as-
sumes that the critic knows better, and in such a vitu-
perative climate it may have been more strategic to des-
ignate such a high-risk appointment to a Muslim intellec-
tual who was similarly qualified, but not as pivotal to the
survival of institutions. Furthermore, while beyond the
scope of analysis here, thematic association suggests a
wider geopolitical element to this entire episode as evi-
denced by periodical placement and editorial stances af-
filiated with UAE rival states such as Qatar (Al Jazeera)
and Turkey (TRT andMaydan). Future research should in-
vestigate such links, whereas other longitudinal research
should investigate whether the professed critical opin-
ions are simply held by a handful of vocal detractors
as Hanson contends, or whether they are actually more
representative of the broader American Muslim commu-
nity’s sentiments.
Ex-United Kingdom Ambassador to Lebanon Tom
Fletcher (2016) argues that it is a mistake for a pub-
lic person to be absent on platforms like Twitter where
one’s constituents and critics are framing the debate.
As a vocal critic laments, representatively, “this article
was sent to Shaykh Hamza for comment at the begin-
ning of this month, but he has not replied” (Al-Azami,
2019). However, ‘punching up’ genre criticism being on
the increase does not necessarily indicate a reasonable
expectation that a commentator on metaphysics, for in-
stance, would start appreciating the analyses of pundits
and start engaging them within their preferred ideolog-
ical frameworks, at their preferred venues. Moreover,
the sheer number of supportive comments in social
media spaces indicates significant support for Hanson
abides. Nevertheless, the privation of his personal en-
gagement on critical platforms translates into a si-
lence thereby interpreted by critics as elitism and tone-
deafness. However, the newfound visceral impertinence
that characterizes criticism of communal elders heav-
ily factors in to why many simply retreat from spaces
where opposing opinions are unwelcomed, substantiat-
ing the hypothesis that online factions appear to be fur-
ther balkanizing (Hampton, 2014).
To the extent that a researcher canminimize the spec-
ulative nature of understanding a person’s rationale or
philosophy by gleaning it fromuncatalogued public state-
ments, there is a wider context for questioning social
media engagement besides the time it demands. For in-
stance, Shoshana Zuboff’s (2019) indictment of surveil-
lance capitalism gives us pause about accepting the ar-
rangements society has with its social media overlords.
Authoritarian countries like China, acknowledging the
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power of these platforms and their impacts on expres-
sion, choose to bring them under the nexus of the state,
while liberal democracies like the United States still allow
private citizens in Silicon Valley to amass and wield their
controlling power. In fact, in early July 2019, Hanson told
Malaysian media figure Sharaad Kuttan (2019) he would
advise China if given the chance specifically because of
their abuse of religious minorities like the Uighurs. There
are also indications that Hanson has acknowledged that
internal clip curation and administrator-run social me-
dia accounts must be institutional priorities. There was
a recorded public exchange at Zaytuna College in August
of 2019 in which Hanson elaborated to a panel why it
was good to have a Muslim voice in the (commission)
room for “countervailence” considering “the wretched
track record” of the Trump administration, adding more
insight to his approach, although video of the dialogue
was not published until October 27, 2019, by which time
the public relations sequence initiated by his adversaries
had already taken effect (Yusuf, 2019). In conclusion, as
the community balkanizes, the best strategy for sym-
metrically engaging governments and critics remains an
open question. This brief analysis ends, therefore, by rec-
ommending further exploration of the synergizing epis-
temic intersection between progressive intersectional
discourses, Arab media, and political Islamist discourses,
which have conventionally been at odds, and now ap-
pear to be coalescing on selective consensus building
and cancellation.
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